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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable Timothy R Hanson. Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
an Order to Show Cause and extending Defendant's formal AP&P probation for a term of 
len years minus the three years previously served. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County in and for the State of Utah 
wrongfully denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause and erroneously 
ruled the Court had jurisdiction to extend the Defendant's probation for a period often years 
(minus three years previously served on probation). "Whether the trial court had the 
authority to extend Defendant's probation is a question of law. We accord a trial court's 
conclusions of law no particular deference, reviewing them for correctness." State v. Wilcox, 
808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Rowlings, 893 P.3d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 
1995). Also, "(b)ecause the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, we review 
for correctness." State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Grate, 
947P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997). 
This issue was preserved in the lower court upon the Defendant's filing of a Motion 
to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and Memorandum in Support 
1 
thereof, and oral argument relating to said Motion, as well as the Judge's ruling denying 
Defendant's Motion (R. 234-378, 481, Add. 4, 386-394). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is relevant to the issues presented on appeal and is attached as 
Addendum 1: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant David J. Orr was initially charged with twenty-eight felonies including 
Securities Fraud, Communications Fraud, Unregistered Securities Agent and Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity (R. 2-8). On March 23, 2000, Defendant entered a Change of Plea to the 
amended charge of Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8) and 
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony (Count 20) (R. 20-21). On May 
12. 2000. Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to two 
indeterminate terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutively. 
At the same time, the Court suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on probation 
for three years to be supervised by the Utah Adult Probation & Parole Department ("AP&P") 
with numerous conditions, including that Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County 
Jail with no credit for time served, and pay restitution as determined by his probation officer. 
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward restitution or 25% 
of his income under the direction of AP&P (R. 22-27). 
? 
Defendant performed satisfactorily during his three years (36 months) of probation, 
but on May 13.2003, Court records show that an AP&P Progress/Violation Report was filed 
with the Court (R. 228-229). On May 19, 2003, an Order to Show Cause was entered by the 
Third District Court (signed on May 13,2003 by Judge Hanson) alleging that the Defendant 
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation "by having failed to pay restitution in 
full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the Probation Agreement/' (Add. 2 & 
3) (R. 230-231, 232-233). On or about May 23, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R. 
234-378). 
The Court held a hearing on June 23,2003 and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
from the Bench and indicated a formal Memorandum Decision and Order would be 
forthcoming (R. 383-384).' The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 
2,2003 formally denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and ruling 
that the Court had jurisdiction and authority to extend Defendant's probation for a maximum 
often years because the Court had sentenced the Defendant to two 0-5 year terms in the Utah 
State Prison, and had suspended those terms ( Add. 4, R. 386-394). The Court also 
concluded that it was not required to place the Defendant on a bench probation as argued by 
1
 The Court apparently combined the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss with the Probation Revocation hearing, although Defendant was not asked to 
admit or deny the allegations in the Order to Show Cause and no evidence was presented 
as to the Defendant's willful failure to pay restitution. Further the Judge made no 
findings on this issue. See Point III infra. 
the Defendant under the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-10(a)(ii)(A) (sic) "because the 
Defendant's probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i) (sic), but was 
instead tolled under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)M (Add. 4, p. 6, R. 391). 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's Decision on July 9, 2003 
bringing us to the present proceedings (R. 395-396). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Defendant David J. Orr was originally charged with twenty-eight felonies under 
the securities laws of the State of Utah (R. 2-8). 
2. On or about March 23, 2000, Defendant waived preliminary hearing and 
entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8 
amended) and Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent (Count 20) also a third degree felony (R. 
20-21). 
3. On May 12, 2000, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson and was sentenced to two terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison with 
the sentences to run consecutively. The Court suspended the prison terms and placed the 
Defendant on probation under certain specific conditions, including that the Defendant was 
required to pay restitution as determined by the Adult Probation & Parole Department. 
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward his restitution, or 
25% of his income, under the direction of the Adult Probation & Parole Department. The 
4 
Court indicated a restitution hearing could be set upon appropriate application (R. 22-24,25-
29). 
4. Court records indicate that on May 13, 2003, a Progress/Violation Report was 
filed by Probation Officer Robert Egelund requesting that the Court issue an Order to Show 
Cause requiring Defendant Orr to appear and show cause, if any he has, why his probation 
should not be revoked and he be committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law, the execution of which had been previously stayed by the Court, 
"(B)y virtue of his having failed to pay restitution in full, as ordered, in violation of a special 
condition of the probation agreement." (R. 228-229, Add. 2, 230-231). 
5. The Defendant was served with the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause on May 
19, 2003 requiring him to appear before the Court on May 30, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. by Agent 
Egelund (Add. 3. R. 232-233). 
6. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause and 
Memorandum in Support thereof for lack of jurisdiction on or about May 22, 2003 (R. 234-
235,236-378). 
7. On or about June 23, 2003, the Court held a hearing regarding Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss at which the Defendant was present and represented by his attorney Larry 
R. Keller and the State was present through its attorney Assistant Salt Lake County District 
Attorney Howard R. Lemcke, Jr. (R. 383-384) (See footnote 1, p. 4 infra). 
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8. While the Court ruled from the bench regarding several of the issues on June 
23,2003. the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on or about July 2,2003 and 
mailed it to the parties (Add. 4, R. 386-394). 
9. Defendant Orr filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9,2003 (R. 395-396), and his 
Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion for Stay of Execution of the July 2, 
2003 Order on or about August 29, 2003 (R. 425-427, 430-473). 
10. Although not indexed in the record on appeal the Court denied Defendant's 
Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause on October 1. 2003, and Defendant appealed the 
denial of the Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause by filing a Motion and Memorandum 
in Support thereof as well as an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of said Motion with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on November 24, 2003. Said Motion remains pending before this Court 
at the time of the writing of this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Orr maintains that the Court's jurisdiction to extend or modify his 
probation ended by operation of law on either May 11, 2003 or May 12, 2003 and that 
additional proceedings undertaken by the Court, and the Court's Order extending his 
probation lor a period often years minus the three years he had already served on probation, 
is in violation of Utah law. Defendant further argues that if the Court did have jurisdiction 
over him, the Court can only extend his probation as a Court probation only and not a formal 
6 
probation with the Adult Probation & Parole Department for purposes of enforcing the 
Court's restitution order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF 
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST 
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME. 
The record in the instant case shows that Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson on May 12, 2000 (R. 22-29). The records further show that on May 13, 
2003 an AP&P Progress/Violation Report and an Affidavit in Support of Order to Show 
Cause were formally filed with the Court (Add. 2, R. 228-231). The record also shows that 
the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on May 13, 2003 requiring the Defendant's 
appearance in Court to answer to the allegation in the Affidavit (Add. 3) (R. 232-233). The 
record shows that the Order to Show Cause itself was signed by the Court on May 13, 2003. 
Id 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a)(i) reads as follows: "Probation may be terminated 
at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions/, Calculating a date which is thirty-six months from the date 
of May 12, 2000, the date upon which Defendant was sentenced, his probation technically 
terminated by law on May 11, 2003 at midnight; or, at the very least. May 12, 2003 at 
midnight. It is Defendant's contention that May 12, 2003 was one day beyond thirty-six 
7 
months, but his argument remains the same whether it was Ma\ 11, 2003 at midnight or May 
12. 2003 at midnight, since documents were not formally filed with the Court and the Order 
to Show Cause process was not begun according to the official Court record until May 13, 
2003 (R. 228-233). 
In its decision, the trial court engaged in the reasoning that, although Defendant was 
placed on probation on May 12, 2000, ". . . the first day of probation would have concluded 
twenty-four hours after the sentence was imposed on or at the close of business on the 
following day. May 13,2000." See, Order attached as Addendum 4, R. 386-394 at 390-391. 
The Court cites no authority for this position; and, in fact, on May 12, 2000, the Court 
specifically ordered Defendant taken into custody and committed to the Salt Lake County Jail 
for a period of six months as a condition of his probation. The Court had Defendant 
handcuffed and removed from the courtroom on May 12, 2000 (R. 23-24). 
If the Court's reasoning is correct, it did not have authority to send Defendant to jail 
as a condition of probation until May 13, 2000, (twenty-four hours following the end of 
business on May 12, 2000), yet the Court clearly believed that the Defendant was on 
probation on May 12, 2000 by having him placed in handcuffs and having him taken 
forthwith from the courtroom as a condition of that probation. 
The Court further indicated that, although the records of the Third District Court 
clearly show that the Progress/Violation Report was not formally filed with the Court until 
May 13, 2003. the fact that probation officer Robert Egelund testified that he brought the 
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Progress/Violation Report into the Court and date stamped it himself on May 9, 2003 was 
dispositive of the matter. The Court ruled that although the filing date on the 
Progress/Violation Report was changed to May 13,2003, apparently by Court personnel the 
Court intended to ignore such change. (Add. 4, p. 4, 5. R. 389, 390). 
Although the Court opined from the bench that the change was probably made by his 
clerk on the date that she filed the document, no testimony or evidence under oath was taken 
to establish that fact in the Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 481, p. 26,1. 24, 25, p. 27,1. 1-
11, p. 28, 1. 6-20, p. 29, 1. 1-5). Furthermore, the clerk of the court was not sworn and 
provided no specific evidence to support the trial Judge's conclusion (R. 481 in its entirety). 
The trial Judge stated from the bench that he recalled that Officer Egelund had come 
to his office on Friday, May 9, 2003 and at that time he had authorized a filing of an Order 
to Show Cause for the purpose of extending probation (R. 481, p. 9,1. 3-7, p. 28,1. 8-25, p. 
29,1. 1-5, p. 30,1. 3-9, p. 33,1. 6-25). The trial Judge was not placed under oath and was not 
examined or cross-examined by the parties, despite the fact that he purported to give 
e\ iclcnce in this case. Because the issue in question was the very jurisdiction of the Court 
to proceed with the Order to Show Cause the trial Judge signed according to the Court's own 
record on May 13, 2003, after Defendant's probation ended according to Defendant's 
calculation, the trial Judge's unsworn testimony and statements from the bench became 
material to the case. It is the position of Defendant that once the Judge determined during 
9 
the course of the hearing that he had become a material witness, the Judge had an obligation 
to recuse himself from further proceedings associated therewith.2 
The Judge ruled in his Order of July 2, 2003 as follows: 
"An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the issuance of an 
Order to Show Cause. The documents in this case reflect that the Court 
approved and authorized issuance of the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 
2003. . . r (Add. 4. p. 5, R. 390, 481). 
However, the Order to Show Cause actually issued by the Court was not signed until 
May 13, 2003 and was actually filed by the clerk on the date of May 13, 2003. (Add. 3, last 
page, R. 232-233). Although the trial judge's unsworn statement from the bench was that 
he actually approved and authorized the issuance of the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 
2003 and thus that date is the date upon which the probationary period was tolled as a result 
of his signing the Order to Show Cause, the fact that it was not signed nor issued, nor filed 
with the Court until May 13, 2003 is a matter of record (Add. 3, R. 232, 233). The Judge's 
unsworn testimony with regard to the date of May 12, 2003 should not have been admitted 
as a basis for establishing the "alternative date for tolling the probationary period" as 
indicated in the Judge's Order of July 2, 2003. 
The Court found that the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) were in full force and 
effect in the instant case beginning on May 9, 2003, the date upon which Mr. Egelund 
2
 See Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E.(l)(d)(iv) which reads as follows, 
*
w( 1) a judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: E.(l)(d)(iv) 
is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding." 
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testified that he date stamped his original Progress/Violation Report, despite the fact that the 
date stamp was changed by someone in the Court system to May 13, 2003 and not formally 
filed with the Court until May 13, 2003. (Add. 4. p. 4. R. 389). The concept of "filing * a 
Court document is determined almost exclusively by the date upon which Court records show 
the document was filed, and not by extrinsic testimony. In considering the question of 
whether or not a notice of appeal was timely filed, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
In determining whether a notice of appeal is timely filed and establishes 
jurisdiction in an appellate court, this court must be bound by the filing date 
indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court. This 
requirement is implicit in provisions of our rules governing timeliness of an 
appeal. We are therefore bound by the date stamped on appellant's notice of 
appeal, and must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re K.G., 2002 
LIT App 3. 2002 WL 23812, at *1 (Jan. 4, 2002). 
In State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the court dismissed a 
prisoner's appeal as untimely by one day even though it took nine days for the court clerk to 
stamp the appeal. Judgment had been entered on October 25, 1994; the prisoner had mailed 
his notice of appeal on November 19, 1994 but it was not date-stamped until November 28, 
1994—one day after the expiration of the time limit for filing notice of appeal (since it was 
a Monday). Parker, 936 P.2d at 1118-19. In dismissing the appeal, the Parker court declined 
to adopt the widely-accepted "prison delivery rule" because 'it is not consistent with the 
plain language of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 [which requires that notice of appeal 
"shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment ... |." Parker, 936 P.2d at 1122. 
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If the date-stamp is so determinative and enforced so strictly against criminal 
defendants, the State should be held to a similar standard given that its agents can hand-
deliver the documents and wait in person for them to be stamped, or stamp them themselves. 
It would be easy for abuse to occur in the Court system if a probation agent who may have 
failed to file a certain report with the Court by a specific deadline realized that he could 
simply go in and stamp a first page of such a report on the due date without actually filing 
it with the Court until some days later. Certainly, this Court ought not to go by extrinsic 
testimony as to when the date stamp might have been placed on the document by Agent 
Egelund, but should go by the date that Court records show it was actually filed with the 
Court. If the date it was actually filed by the Court is not important and has no meaning, why 
then would the Court not give it the official date upon which it was date stamped by the 
individual who filed it? The date of filing is extremely important as indicated above, and 
May 13, 2003, the date that the Progress/Violation Report was considered by Court records 
to be filed, and the date upon which the Court signed the Order to Show Cause, should be 
the dispositive dates in this matter. 
POINT II. DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF 
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST 
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE HE 
WAS NOT PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S ACTION 
UNTIL MAY 19, 2003. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have ruled in numerous cases 
that a trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and 
12 
although the trial court has discretion in these matters, the trial court's discretion must be 
exercised within limits imposed by the legislature.3 Since U.C.A. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) (as 
amended 2003) requires a termination of probation "upon completion without violation of 
36 months probation/" it is the position of Defendant that the Court did not have jurisdiction 
to proceed with the Order to Show Cause against him. The filing of the Progress/Violation 
Report and Order to Show Cause on May 13, 2003 was not sufficient to create jurisdiction 
in the Court when such jurisdiction automatically terminated on May 11, 2003 at midnight 
by operation of law (or May 12, 2003 at midnight as the Court may determine). Therefore, 
the Court should have granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause for 
Lack of Jurisdiction in the Court. In addition to the foregoing however. Defendant's right 
to due process of law under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions was violated because he 
was not provided with notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. 
*' Although there was controversy in the lower court regarding the precise date that 
documents prepared by AP&P were "filed*', there was no conflicting evidence regarding the 
date upon which the Defendant was served with notice of the Order to Show Cause. The 
Defendant was served on May 19, 2003, at least seven days after his probation should have 
terminated by operation of law according to the Court's records (Add. 3, R. 233). 
Furthermore. Agent Egelund testified at the hearing in the above-entitled matter that he did 
" Sec, Slate v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988); State v. CowdelL 626 P.2d 487 
(Utah 1981): Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990); State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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not serve the Defendant until May 19, 2003 because "(T)hat was the soonest I was going to 
see him.v Mr. Egelund admitted that he didn't make any extra effort to notify him of the 
Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the Court would revoke, extend or 
modify his probation until May 19th. (R. 481, p. 22,1. 8-20). Furthermore, Agent Egelund 
admitted that he informed the Defendant prior to May 12, 2003 that his intention was to 
recommend to Judge Hanson that his probation be terminated and the matter of restitution 
be handled through the civil process as a judgment (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14). 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court itself, in making its comments at the Order to 
Show Cause hearing on June 23, 2003, made the following statement: 
THE COURT: Mr. Keller, when Mr. Egelund came down he says, *;Mr. Orr's 
probation is going to terminate. We don't want to deal with him any more," 
and 1 said, "Wrong. I want you to deal with him. I want probation to continue, 
because he won't pay unless I am holding the prison term over his head," 
which is evidenced by the fact that he apparently hasn't made the May 
payment or the June payment. (R. 481, p. 30,1. 3-9). 
Therefore, the evidence is clear that Defendant was led by his probation officer to 
believe that the probation officer was going to recommend termination and that his probation 
would be terminated and he would be required to continue to pay restitution as part of the 
civil process. It was a shock to Defendant when he was served with the Order to Show 
Cause on May 19, 2003. 
It is the contention of Defendant that his probation ended by operation oflaw on either 
May 11, 2003 or May 12,2003, and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time, because 
he was not provided notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. In State v. Rawlings, 
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893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a trial court lost 
jurisdiction to initiate probation extension proceedings against the probationer upon 
expiration of probation. In that case, Defendant had been sentenced on October 11, 1985 
after pleading guilty to a single count of attempted sodomy on a child, a first degree felony. 
Defendant's probation was to expire by operation of law on May 6. 1987 by virtue of his 
ha\ ing completed eighteen months on probation. Although the Adult Probation & Parole 
department generated a memorandum directed to the trial court which suggested extending 
the Defendant's probation because he needed to continue in treatment, no motion was filed 
or made by the court or prosecutor to extend Defendant's probation. The Court of Appeals 
there noted that, although the trial court was apparently made aware of the recommendation 
and a hearing was scheduled, the Defendant received nothing in writing and only learned of 
the hearing when advised thereof casually by a hospital aid two days before the hearing date. 
The court then extended Defendant's probation for an additional eighteen months. Id. at 
1065. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "(I)t is well settled that a probationer shall be 
accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation seriously 
deprives a person or his or her liberty." (citations omitted)... Id. at 1067. Although the Court 
went on to note that the matter was less clear with regard to probation extension proceedings, 
~...because of the high risk of prejudice to the probationer when he or she is not given notice 
of the extension hearing and the hearing is conducted ex-parte, these courts have invoked 
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their supenisory powers requiring the necessary parties to (1) give the probationer notice of 
the extension hearing; (2) advise the probationer that he or she has a right to a hearing and7or 
(3) advise the probationer that he or she has the right to the assistance of counsel." (citations 
omitted) Id. at 1067. 
The Court then specifically ruled: "We hold that a probationer in the State of Utah is 
accorded a measure of due process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled 
to the available protections." Id. 
In the instant case, Defendant Orr was not notified of any type of action being taken 
against him until May 19, 2003, seven (or eight) days after his probation terminated by 
operation of law. The instant Order to Show Cause was styled as a probation revocation 
hearing at which the Court was being asked by Adult Probation & Parole to consider 
revoking the Defendant's probation and send him to prison. Therefore, all of the due process 
requirements of a probation revocation hearing, including proper notice of the proceedings 
prior to the time probation terminates by operation of law, must be provided to the 
Defendant, or it becomes a violation of his right to due process of law as held by the Court 
in Rowlings. 
The Utah Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 
1999). The Court reiterated the proposition that: 
(Prior) cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the 
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive 
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer 
must be given notice of that intent otherwise the probationer is left in a state 
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of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his 
probation. 
(Emphasis added). 980 P.2d ^11 at 203. 
The court cited its previous cases in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and 
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) for this proposition, and clearly indicated in Call 
that this principle was still good law in this State. However, due to the fact that the defendant 
in Call had signed a waiver of personal appearance, and a waiver of his right to a hearing and 
an agreement to extend his probation for an additional year prior to the date that the 
probation terminated by operation of law, the court ruled against the defendant in that 
particular case. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the court clearly stated that due 
process requires that the state must take definitive action to extend the term before the 
expiration date of the probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent. 
In Defendant Orrs case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant 
wasn't notified until May 19, 2003 of the Court's action. 
This issue was elucidated even more clearly by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case 
of State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997). In that case, defendant was sentenced 
on January 16. 1987 to 1-15 years in prison and was placed on 18 months probation. The 
Adult Probation & Parole Department filed an Incident Report with the trial court on June 
12. 1987 alleging Grate had violated his probation by being arrested for auto burglary. Grate 
had been arrested on July 8, 1987 on the court's bench warrant based upon the Incident 
Report and the court noted that Grate's 18-month probation period was due to terminate on 
17 
July 15, 1988. However, because AP&P did not file its Affidavit in Support of an Order to 
Show Cause until July 2 L 1988 and Grate was not served with the Order to Show Cause 
until August 9, 1988 the court ultimately ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
proceed with the Order to Show Cause as defendant's probation had terminated by operation 
oflawonJul) 15, 1988. 
In the Grate case, the Court stated: 
Under Utah law, it is the notice to a person of the commencement of a judicial 
enforcement action that distinguishes the filing of an information in a criminal 
proceeding or the issuance of an OSC in a probation setting, from the filing of 
an incident report. In each of the former instances, there is no ambiguity as to 
the State's intention to enforce its rights within a judicial proceeding or the 
defendant's need to prepare a defense. Furthermore, all the procedural 
structures which attach to a court proceeding are activated. 
In contrast, the filing of an incident report does not commence a probation 
revocation proceeding. See, Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-29(1) (1987). Such 
report need not be served on the probationer, nor does the filing necessarily 
activate any court proceeding or require the probationer to respond. See 
Id. Indeed, a probationer may never learn about the filing of such a report. . . 
. rather, it is only when a probationer is served with an OSC that the 
probationer receives actual notice of the state's decision to proceed 
against the probationer for any violations. . . . 
(Emphasis supplied) 947 P.2d at 1165. 
The court found that the critical element involved in the process was notice to the 
probationer that action was to be taken against him. The court went on to state: 
Most obviously, the notice must inform the probationer of the specific 
violations the state believes he or she has committed. Equally important, 
however, is that such notice inform the probationer that he or she is being -
rather than may at some future date be - called into court to respond to the 
state's allegations . . . 
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However. Grate received no notice within his initial probation term of an 
imminent need to appear in court to respond to those allegations. . . . 
We conclude that a probationer is not charged with a probation violation 
within § 77-18-l(8)(a) until he or she has received written notice both of 
the nature of the allegations against him or her and of the pendency of an 
enforcement action in the trial court requiring a response. We further 
conclude that because Grate was not charged with a probation violation within 
the original term of his probation, his probation terminated as a matter of law7 
on July 15, 1988, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Grate's 
probation on August 12. 1988. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of 
Grate's 1999 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. 
(Emphasis supplied). 947 P.2d at 1168. 
In the Grate case, the Court analyzed the previous cases of the Utah Supreme Court 
which it believed supported its decision in that case. The Court looked at Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) and noted that the Court had reviewed a proceeding in which an 
affidavit supporting an Order to Show Cause was filed within the probationer's term but the 
Order to Show Cause was not served on the probationer until after that term had expired. 
The Grate court observed ". . . In rejecting the state's argument that filing of the affidavit 
tolled the running of the probationer's term, the court focused on both 'the nature and degree 
of notice to which an individual is entitled (under § 77-18-1) prior to a revocation hearing.' 
Id at 795". 947 P.2d at 1166. 
As the Grate court noted, the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Cook concluded 
. . . (T)hat the "emphasis on notice . . . is consistent with the assertion that a 
court retains authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served with 
notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation period" and that the 
"assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the period of probation 
in order for the court to retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent 
with the rationale underlying our decision in Green" Cook, 803 P.2d at 795 
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(emphasis added). This court later reiterated that proper notice must be 
""reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections/" Rowlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted)). 
(Emphasis in original) Id. at 1166. 
This decision in State v. Grate by the Utah Court of Appeals was handed down on 
October 30, 1997. It should be noted that the tolling statute relied upon by the Court in the 
instant case. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (1996) (as amended in 1989) was in full force 
and effect. The Utah Court of Appeals in that case reversed a trial court that had denied 
Grate's motion (essentially a motion to dismiss the probation revocation proceedings) on the 
basis that the filing of the Incident Report on June 12, 1987 had tolled the running of Grate's 
probation under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) until the OSC was signed on July 19,1988. The trial court 
had rejected Grate's claim that the tolling of the probation period without notice to him had 
violated his due process rights. As indicated, the Court of Appeals reversed. 
The trial court in the instant case relied on this same tolling provision of the Utah 
Code to deny Defendant Orr's Motion to Dismiss (Add. 4, p. 7, R. 392). It is clear that 
Defendant On* was not served with notice of AP&P's Incident Report and the OSC until 
seven days after his probation ended. This and the fact that he was lulled into believing that 
the Adult Probation & Parole Department and the Court would terminate his probation on 
May 12, 2003 should be a dispositive factor in this Court's analysis. Defendant's due 
process rights under both Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution were violated in this circumstance, much the same as defendant 
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Grate's rights were held to have been violated by the Utah Court of Appeals in his situation. 
The Court declined to consider any violation of the Defendant Orr's right of due process of 
law by virtue of the fact that he was not served until May 19. 2003, seven days after his 
probation was scheduled to terminate by operation of law. (Add. 4. p. 6-7, R. 391-392). 
The Grate court considered this tolling provision of Utah law and determined that it 
had no force and effect because of the failure of the State of Utah to have served the 
defendant with the Order to Show Cause until several days after his probation was due to 
terminate. Because the defendant was denied legal notice, it was a violation of his right to 
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 
See, Grate al 1163. 1167.4 
4
 Although the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in the case of State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 
152 (Utah App. 1997) that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (1995) prevented the court from being 
required to dismiss that particular case for lack of jurisdiction because a violation report 
was filed with a trial court and a warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued, the court 
found that the defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah without 
permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served." Id. at 
153. Because this case was decided several months prior to the Grate case, and because it 
is clear that the defendant had left the jurisdiction and could not be served with the 
court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant Orr maintains that this case is 
inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him. Reedy's due process rights 
were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and leaving the state so he could 
not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant case. If it were otherwise, 
the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as precedent. Reedy was decided April 
17. 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997. Davis, P.J. sat on both panels. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO EXTEND 
PROBATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT ENTER ANY FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION OF HIS 
PROBATION, LET ALONE ANY FINDING THAT SUCH A 
VIOLATION WAS WILLFUL. 
Under Utah law, "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer 
has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (2003). 
Furthermore, "[probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(ii) 
(2003). In other words, the sentencing court must reveal both "the evidence relied on and 
the reasons for revoking probation" in order "to enable a reviewing court to accurately 
determine the basis for the trial court's decision." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); see also Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979) (noting that 
the reviewing function of an appellate court is seriously undermined where findings are 
insufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which ultimate conclusions are reached—in 
the context of a civil case, where no liberty interest was at stake). In the instant case, the 
district court ordered Defendant Orr's probation extended, but entered no "finding that the 
conditions of probation ha[d] been violated[,]" as required under section 77-18-1(12)(a)(i) 
or (ii). Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ordering an extension of Defendant Orr's 
formal probation. 
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In the context of an allegation that probation has been violated by a failure to pay 
restitution, the standards are even stricter. Where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a 
fine and/or restitution, the sentencing court "must either find that probationer was at fault or 
that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the state's interests in 
punishment and deterrence." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (citing Bear den v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660. 662 (1983)). As the Hodges court stated. "[w]e believe that... in order to revoke 
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful/'* Hodges, 
798 P.2d at 276. In the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution (i.e. as grounds for 
revocation/modification of probation), "a finding of willfulness merely requires a finding that 
the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation/' State 
v. Petersen, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations, citation omitted; 
emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court made no finding that Defendant 
O r had violated any term of his probation, let alone that such an alleged violation was 
willful. Without finding both a violation and willfulness (i.e. the absence of bona fide 
efforts to pay restitution), the district court had no basis for ordering an extension of his 
probation, even if this Court rules it still had jurisdiction/ 
s
 If the Court chooses to reverse and remand on this issue, it is respectfully 
requested the Court decide the other issues as well, because once the Court issues 
findings upon remand, the same issues will need to be appealed again. Judicial economy 
should dictate this result. 
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POINT IV. THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN 
ORDERING PROBATION BEYOND THE STATUTORILY 
MANDATED TIME FRAME AND STRUCTURE. 
As indicated previously in this brief, a court's poAver to grant, modify, or revoke 
probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the 
trial court's discretion must be exercised within limits imposed by the legislature, Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990); State v. Green, 757 p.2d 462 (Utah 1988); See also State 
v. CowdelU 626 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981). Therefore, it stands to reason that a court cannot 
sentence a defendant to any particular term of probation without specific legislative authority 
to do so. 
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded he had authority and discretion to "extend 
the defendant's probation up to the remaining term of the court's original sentence (equating 
to 10 years)."* Although the trial court concluded that whatever flexibility it had in 
sentencing must be exercised within legislatively established limits and quoted State v. 
Green, the Court went on to conclude "Further, the Court can find no express limitation on 
the permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together with any extensions, not 
exceed the legislatively established sentencing guidelines." (R. 392-393). The Court cited 
no authority for this proposition, and concluded from this principle that it had discretion, 
apparently from its inherent powers, to extend the Defendant's probation up to the remaining 
'' The Court had sentenced the Defendant to two consecutive terms of 0-5 years in 
the Utah State Prison and suspended that sentence (R. 22, 23). 
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term of the Court's original sentence (equating to ten years). Since we know that the trial 
court's power to extend probation must be exercised within limits imposed by the legislature, 
we must look to the legislature to determine what powers it has granted the Court in this 
regard. The inherent powers of the Court play no part in this analysis under the controlling 
case law cited earlier in this point. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a) is the statute which places a limitation on the power 
of the Court with regard to the time a Court may keep an individual on probation. This 
statute has been amended from time to time, and was previously eighteen months. The 
statute presently reads ww( 10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion 
of the Court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class 
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." 
There is no jurisdiction of the C art to place Defendant on formal probation in excess of 
thirty-six months, except as provided in subsection (12)(a)(i) and (ii) which allows probation 
to be modified, extended or revoked upon a finding that probationer had violated the 
conditions of probation. Defendant could find no Utah case which addresses the length of 
lime probation may be extended upon a determination that there has been a probation 
\ iolation. but it is presumed it could not be extended in excess of the thirty-six months 
allowed under subsection (10)(a)(i).7 
7
 It should be noted that if probation expires or terminates under (10)(a)(i) and an 
unpaid balance remains regarding restitution, the Court may retain jurisdiction of the case 
and continue the Defendant on bench probation. There appears to be no time limit on this 
25 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court made clear that the only purpose for the 
extension of probation for the ten year term was that the Judge believed that fcfc(B)ecause the 
defendant's only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to avoid his probation 
being revoked, the court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the defendant's 
probation for the maximum length permissible, the remaining full term of his sentence of 10 
years/* (Add. 4, p. 8, R. 393). 
It is noteworthy that the Defendant was never asked to admit or deny the allegation 
of failure to pay restitution against him, and the Court never entered any finding with regard 
to the Defendant's failure to pay restitution as being a violation of probation. See Point III 
supra. Although defense counsel pointed out to the Court that if the Court intended to keep 
Defendant on probation for purposes of payment of restitution, it would be necessary to make 
that a bench probation rather than a formal probation with AP&P, the Court concluded "The 
tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to it's legislative termination sounds a death 
knell to two of the defendant's principle arguments. First the defendant argues that under 
§ 77-18-1 (10)(a)(ii)(A) this Court can retain jurisdiction over him only under the form of a 
bench probation. However, this provision never comes into play because the Defendant's 
probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i), but was instead tolled under § 
77-18-1(1 l)(b). . . . " (R. 391). 
authority, but it is to be noted that this section does not address formal probation with the 
Utah State Department of Adult Probation & Parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
l(10)(a)(ii)(A) (2003). 
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The Court mistakenly determined that the mere fact that it found that Defendant's 
probation was tol led under §77-18-1(11 )(b) and therefore the filing of the Progress/Violation 
Report and Order to Show Cause were within the time period of Defendant's probation, he 
could automatically ignore §77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). It is again noteworthy that at no time did 
the Court make a finding that Defendant had violated his probation. The Court simply 
assumed that because it was clear the Defendant had not paid the full amount of restitution 
ordered of $110,000.00 (R. 121, 122), as well as the additional $255,504.39 added to the 
restitution by Order of January 31, 2002 (R. 170, 171), the Defendant had failed to pay full 
restitution. In fact, the Defendant had been paying $ 1,000.00 a month for thirty-six months 
as ordered by the Court in its original Sentencing, but it was clear the Defendant had thus far 
paid only $36,000.00 at most (R. 26-27). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i)(A) reads as follows: 
If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as 
defined in § 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing 
the payment of the account receivable. 
As stated previously, the Court simply determined that there was no expiration or 
termination of the probation period under subsection (10)(a)(i) based upon the tolling statute, 
and therefore he was entitled to extend the Defendant's probation an additional seven years 
(ten years minus the three years previously served on probation). Defendant argues that the 
Court has misinterpreted the law. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the forerunner of § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(ii) in the 
case of State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah App. 1992) in which a defendant had plead 
guilty to criminal mischief and was ordered to pay a certain amount in restitution and placed 
on probation. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that although the court's jurisdiction 
regarding defendant's compliance with probation conditions had lapsed after a certain period 
of time, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the payment of restitution to the victim. In 
that case, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled: 
%\ . . this court concludes, however, that the subsection is actually intended to 
insure that mandatory termination of probation not affect the trial court's 
jurisdiction for the purpose of collecting restitution. The legislature 
anticipated both situations where the court might order restitution but no 
probation and situations where the court might decide upon a payment 
schedule for restitution which would extend beyond the probation period. The 
legislature, therefore, provided a separate, limited source of jurisdiction by 
which the court could recall a defendant and hold him or her accountable for 
full payment of restitution or fines according to the sentencing order to which 
defendant had previously agreed." 
841 P.2dat 1208. 
Therefore, it would seem that the legislature granted jurisdiction to the Court to enforce 
restitution independent of the probationary status of the defendant. 
In the case of State v. Allen, 2000 UT App. 340, 15 P.3d 110, the Utah Court of 
Appeals illuminated its decision in Dickey by first noting that the general rule is that a trial 
court may not extend probationary jurisdiction to enforce conditions of probation unless 
extension proceedings are timely initiated (citing Smith v. Cook and State v. Green, supra.) 
The Court went on to state as follows: 
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However. Utah law provides an independent legal basis for restitution, 
allowing a court to require a defendant to pay restitution after his probation has 
been terminated . . . 
Recent!}', this court reemphasized that trial court's ma}' retain jurisdiction over 
criminal defendants for purposes of restitution, independent of a defendant's 
probationary status. In State v Nones, the defendant argued that under 
changes in the restitution statute made since Dickey, the trial court could not 
enforce its restitution order against her after probation expired. See Nones, 11 
P.3d 709, 2000 UT App 211, H 4, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. Applying the 
reasoning of Dickey we held that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the 
legislatures clarification of the statute. 
2000 UT App. 340 Tl 9, 11, 15 P.3d 110. 
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that it was absolutely not necessary for the Court 
to continue Defendant Orr on formal AP&P probation for the remainder of the ten years 
merely for the purpose of collecting restitution. Since the power of the Court to enforce 
restitution orders exists independent of probation status, the Court clearly could have placed 
Defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
restitution amounts as allowed and required under § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii). Whether this is true 
or not however, the Court simply had no authority to extend Defendant's probation for a 
period often years and to maintain him on formal AP&P probation for that entire period for 
the limited purpose of enforcing restitution, which was the Court's expressly stated goal. 
(Add. 4, p. 8. R. 393, 481. p. 30.1. 3-9. 17-20). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court rule that his probation terminated by 
operation of law on cither May 11.2003 or May 12. 2003. and that the Court lost jurisdiction 
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over him on one of those two dates. In the alternative. Defendant requests this Court find 
that since the only basis for the Court's determination to extend Defendant's probation was 
to pay restitution, any probation must be bench probation pursuant to the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). 
Dated this ) f day of n^c^J^— . 2003. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
LARRY O J E L L E 
Attorney for Defendant 
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77-18-12. Grounds for denial of certificate 
of eligibility — Effect of prior 
convictions. 
77-18-13. Hearing — Standard of proof— 
Exception. 
77-18-14. Order to expunge — Distribu-
tion of order — Redaction — 
Receipt of order — Adminis-
trative proceedings — Divi-
sion requirements. 
77-18-15. Retention of expunged records 
— Agencies. 
77-18-16. Penalty. 
77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
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(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(hi) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(hi) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
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sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(hi) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
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(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon wsdver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
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(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(hi) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(hi) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(hi) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only sifter the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
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(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2; 
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch. 
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3; 
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch. 
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3; 
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996, 
ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94, 
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7; 
2001, ch. 137, § l;2002,ch.35,§ 7; 2002 (5th 
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment by ch. 279, effective May 3, 1999, substi-
tuted references to accounts receivable under § 
76-3-201.1 for references to fines, restitution, 
and other assessed costs under Subsection 76-
3-201(4) in Subsections (9) and (10); deleted 
"upon order of the court" before "shall collect" 
near the beginning of Subsection (9); added 
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
&EPUTY CLERK 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER T O S H O W C A U S E 
COURT C A S E N O : 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
D E F A T T Y : Larry R. Keller 
) 
):ss 
): 
S T A T E OF U T A H 
C O U N T Y OF SALT LAKE 
R O B E R T EGELLND, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: H e is a 
Probation Officer for the Utah State Department o f Corrections; that on the 23rd day o f March, 
2 0 0 0 , the above-named defendant w a s adjudged guilty of the crime o f Real Estate Broker/Agent 
With Out License, 3rd Degree Felony, Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony, in the above-entitled 
Court and on the 12th day o f May, 2000 , was sentenced to serve a term o f 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison; that the execution o f the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant w a s placed 
on probation under the supervision o f the Department o f Corrections; that the above-entitled 
defendant did violate the terms and conditions o f the defendant's probation as fol lows, to-wit: 
/*<W 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
1. By having failed to pa) • restitution in full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the 
Probation Agreement 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order from the Court issue directing and 
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any 
he/she has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant 
should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison, 
ROBERT EGELl^D, PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
i&u— 
NOTARY PUB: 
Residing: .Utah 
Commission expires: 
Tab 3 
IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff 
Defendant, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COURT CASE NO: 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R_ Hanson 
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds 
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions 
of his/her probation as sen forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of 
defendant's probation is justified. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the 
day of ff^Oj^ 2G^rat the hour of ff/^'^then and there to show cause why probation 
of said defendant should jot be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations 
contained in the Affid&vL on file with the Court. 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and 
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has 
a right to present evidence as provided in the UtaH Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED THIS & day oV flfifr/j 2 0 # 2 > 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was 
personally served upon the defendant at <=0-Af?P 3\o U- fw/r/^jf VD~y showing the 
original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the I^J day of 
r l f t ^ 20^3 additional copies were delivered to ("/Ut^j AfTMAJt^f \ counsel for 
the defendant, on the __^ Q day of / / f f i f 20^/J 
ROBERT EGEL1 PROBATION OFFICER 
Tab 4 
FILES BISTBICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL - 2 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTf 
B y - Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID JAY ORR, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 001902772 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23, 
2003, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to 
Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction. The State elicited testimony 
from Robert Egelund, the defendant's AP&P officer. The Court 
received into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's 
copies of the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit in 
Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of which were originally 
filed with the Court). 
Following Mr. Egelund's testimony and oral argument from the 
prosecution and counsel for the defendant, the Court ruled from the 
bench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied and that he 
was to make up the May and June restitution payments. The Court 
took under advisement the issue of whether the defendant's 
probation may be extended to the limit or term of the original 
sentence. The Court also indicated to counsel that a more thorough 
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discussion of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to 
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court 
would issue. Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (the State did not file a-jresponse) and having considered 
counsel's arguments and Mr. Egelund's testimony, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this 
Court lacks the jurisdiction to initiate probation extension 
proceedings against him because these proceedings were not 
initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation 
of law. The defendant's argument is based on an erroneous 
presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2003, and that 
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03, 
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed. 
The legal analysis of whether this Court has the jurisdiction 
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when 
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the 
defendant's probation would have terminated. As an aside, the 
Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court 
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given 
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential 
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the 
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defendant, such a Report is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking an 
extension of his probation, even if it had been timely filed. 
The Court concludes that the styling of the report is 
unimportant given that the Court has a wide latitude and 
flexibility in determining whether probation should be revoked or 
modified (including the possibility of extending the probationary 
term). Because it is the Court and not AP&P that fashions these 
remedies, how AP&P chooses to style the reports that it files with 
the Court has no import in the Court's ultimate determination of 
the appropriate remedy. In this case, the Court opts for extending 
the defendant's probation, as opposed to revoking it altogether. 
Therefore, the Court will refer to these proceedings as a probation 
extension proceeding. Having addressed the defendant's argument on 
this point, the Court proceeds to analyze the timing of the filings 
that initiated this probation extension proceeding. 
Under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1(11) (b) , ,f[t]he running of 
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court." The first issue therefore becomes 
when the Progress/Violation Report was filed and whether it tolled 
the running of the defendant's probation period under §77-18-
1(11) (b) . 
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The filing date for the Progress/Violation Report was 
established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund. Mr. Egelund 
testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 2003, and 
pursuant to that meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date 
for the purpose of filing the Progress/Violation Report and the 
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause. Mr. Egelund 
specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, he brought copies of 
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and left them in 
the intake basket for the Court's clerk. In support of this 
testimony, Mr. Egelund offered his copies of the Progress/Violation 
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked 
Exhibits 1 and 2) . A review of these documents indicates hand-
written changes to the May 9, 2003, date-stamp to reflect a date of 
May 13, 2003. However, the copy of Order to Show Cause attached to 
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) has no such hand-written 
change. This copy of the Order to Show Cause clearly shows a date-
stamp of May 9, 2003. Taking together the documentary evidence 
before the Court in light of Mr. Egelund's credible testimony, the 
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit 
were filed on May 9, 2003, but that for reasons that the Court need 
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to 
reflect an apparent date that the documents were docketed. 
However, the pivotal date under §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of 
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docketing, but rather the date of filing. In this case, this date 
is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered 
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2 003, and that he 
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003. 
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the 
issuance of an order to show cause. The documents in this case 
reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance of the 
Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003. Having established the dates 
of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the 
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate 
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination 
of the defendant's probation.1 
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May 
12, 2000. The Court reasons that the first day of probation would 
have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the 
close of business on the following day, May 13, 2000. Therefore, 
1
 During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made 
by the Court at a February 16, 2001, hearing, as providing the 
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's 
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that 
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate 
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not 
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a 
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the 
Court does not rely on the February 16, 2 001, date in its 
analysis. 
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law on 
May 13, 2 0 03, the termination date of the defendant's 36-month 
probationary period. Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the 
Progress/Violation Report on May 9, 2 0 03, and this Court's 
authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003, 
both occurred prior to the legislative termination of the 
defendant's probation. The defendant's probation period was 
therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12, 
2003 . 
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its 
legislative termination sounds a death knell to two of the 
defendant's principal arguments. First, the defendant argues that 
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A) , this Court can retain jurisdiction over 
him * only under the form of a bench probation. However, this 
provision never comes into play because the defendant's probation 
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10(a) (i) , but was instead 
tolled under §77-18-1(11) (b) . 
Second, the defendant argues that the due process concerns of 
State v. Call, 980 P. 2d 201 (Utah 1999) , have been violated in this 
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend 
his probation before the expiration of his probation period. Once 
again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because 
the defendant's probation did not expire, it was tolled. 
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Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show 
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period and was 
therefore appropriate under due process considerations. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has 
jurisdiction to extend the defendant's probation because the 
probation extension proceedings were initiated prior to the 
legislative termination of the probation period and served to toll 
the probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss is therefore denied. 
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the 
defendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of 
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 3S-month 
intervals or for the full duration of his remaining 10-year 
sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutively). 
The Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute 
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law 
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and 
probation to its essence provides that while the Court has a large 
measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively 
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). 
Further, the Court can find no express limitation on the 
permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together 
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with any extensions, not exceed the legislatively established 
sentencing guidelines. 
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that 
it has the discretion to extend the defendant's probation up to the 
remaining term of the Court's original sentence (equating to 10 
years). The defendant's failure to pay the May and June 
installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the 
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the 
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over 
him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making 
restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the 
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the 
defendant's probation for the maximum length permissible, the 
remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and extending his 
probation in the manner indicated above. 
Dated this .day o f w i ^ 2003 . 
TIMO?HY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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